Shallow men believe in luck or in circumstance. Strong men believe in cause and effect. (Ralph Waldo Emerson, The Conduct of Life, 1860)
Gravity’s effect is variable, but its influence (as far as I know) is unavoidable. Friction has both beneficial and problematic effects depending on context or purpose. Supply chains constantly manage gravity and friction. We pull. We push. We lift. We load. We wrap. We slide. We hold. We leave behind. We do whatever we can to keep flow going.
Supply Chain Resilience seeks to understand the cause of any slowing or stopping. If we can, we will correct the cause. But especially when causes are not well-understood or not quickly correctable, resilience involves transferring, avoiding, reducing or even accepting effects and continuing to flow the best we can.
As a long-time supply chain manager once told me, “Moving is living, stasis is death.”
I have seen this predisposition win again and again despite earthquakes and aftershocks, tsunamis, cyclones, pandemic, blackouts, wildfires, and riots. Pausing and probing are common. Shipping volumes and velocity are re-fashioned by due diligence and care. Different routes, altered schedules, longer cycle times, revised cargoes, and many more adaptations are undertaken — all designed to result in fulfilling demand the best as supply conditions will allow.
Dramatically Increased tariffs and related turmoil are already disrupting flows. Given the cost-related magnitude and rapid rate of change, full effects will unfold perniciously, accumulate, and multiply. When, where, and precisely why a toxic concentration of absence or congestion will climax is often the result of complex, almost unpredictable network behaviors.
The tariffs — and tariff-makers — are the cause of the problem. Whether the cause is justifiable prompts disagreement. There are cogent arguments for, against, and otherwise. In any case, the tariffs are causing serious disruption — and further destruction is reasonably anticipated. Channels are closing. Nodes are being cut off. Pull persists, but push is being pushed away. Feedback loops are being distorted, noise is increasing, signals are diverted, neglected, and sometimes lost. Demand is being silenced. Even worse, demand is being disrupted. Supply is being stopped.
This is not unprecedented. It happens everyday at lower end scope and scale. Everyday supply chain managers overcome these threats. At higher end scope and scale — such as the Triple Disaster in Japan or the Covid Pandemic — I have seen smart, creative, courageous supply chain strategists and practitioners overcome enormous challenges. Global to local supply chains are experiencing pain. The pain will get worse. But there is cause to anticipate resilient potential.
There is also cause for deep concern. The world’s largest economy is attempting to radically — rapidly — reform global trade by rationing access to US consumers. The tariffs will work (or not) by purposefully curtailing US consumption of products made outside the United States and spurring global consumption of products that are or may someday be made in the United States. Watch the curve on the chart of real Personal Consumption Expenditures. The angle of future ascent or descent will reveal a great deal.
The tariffs are the intentional use of surgical trauma to pursue a particular vision of enhanced economic wellness. For the United States, this is a whole-network trauma. For the rest of the world these network-effects are somewhat less all-encompassing, but still a serious body-blow.
Whole-network supply chain disruption/destruction is unusual. The pandemic came close. Otherwise, in my experience, even the deepest supply chain wounds have been able to depend on increased flows from other parts of the network. The March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident was a a whole-network event for Tohoku, but its recovery was expedited by proximity to Tokyo and acceleration of flows from around the world.
Intentional whole network disruption/destruction of supply and demand is even more unusual. My only significant, sustained experience of this dynamic has been in the aftermath of Brexit (here too) and in the context of the war in Gaza (here and here). Brexit was — and remains — disruptive, especially to the British economy. Brexit’s supply chain disruptions were, however, caused by an explicit choice confirmed by democratic and due-process measures over several years. Destruction of Gaza’s already fragile demand and supply network was suddenly imposed by unilateral actions undertaken by decision-makers external to Gaza.
In the case of both Brexit and Gaza, perceptions of intention have had significant influence on how supply chains (and their operators) adapted to change. In the case of the United Kingdom exiting the European Union — for good or ill, right or wrong — intention was eventually perceived as deliberate and orderly. Supply chain operators have focused on making the best of a bad situation. In tragic contrast, Gazans and many others perceive the purposeful destruction of their supply chains to be punitive, perfidious, and worse. In the case of Brexit, perceptions finally prompted creativity and forward-leaning investment. In the case of Gaza, I have mostly witnessed deepening despair and paralysis.
There is a huge difference between: “This threat is real” or “I am being specifically targeted”. A natural disaster can prompt creativity and collaboration. A disaster discerned as avoidable and insidious incites blaming, scapegoating, and varieties of self-destruction. Before my experience with Gaza, I underestimated the practical power of this distinction. I tried to treat intentional harm as no worse than seismic aftershocks. I was wrong. Perceived malign intent is much more of a constraint on Supply Chain Resilience than any seismic recurrence.
During the presidential campaign Mr. Trump was explicit regarding his goals for tariff revenues and using tariffs to spur reindustrialization of the US economy. As with Brexit, his tariff policy benefits from its connection to this democratic process. As with Brexit, it was a close vote. Unlike Brexit, the presidential election involved issues extending well beyond any one policy. As with early implementation of Brexit, there is a perceived lack of deliberate and orderly implementation. There is a growing perception of arbitrary, contradictory, incompetent tariff implementation. Brexit implementation did, however, at long-last improve and is now the accepted reality. (Added on 4/16: Advice to shell-shocked Americans from Brexit Britain)
Still, Brexit would probably not win another referendum. Continuation of the current tariff strategy may well depend on how consumers — who also vote in November 2026 for the US House and one-third of the Senate — come to view tariffs. Well-intentioned and worth the trouble — or — punitive and perfidious? Even before voters have their say, supply chain operators are even now assessing causes, effects, and implications for future flows.
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When two things occur successively we call them cause and effect if we believe one event made the other one happen. If we think one event is the response to the other, we call it a reaction. If we feel that the two incidents are not related, we call it a mere coincidence. If we think someone deserved what happened, we call it retribution or reward, depending on whether the event was negative or positive for the recipient. If we cannot find a reason for the two events’ occurring simultaneously or in close proximity, we call it an accident. Therefore, how we explain coincidences depends on how we see the world. Is everything connected, so that events create resonances like ripples across a net? Or do things merely co-occur and we give meaning to these co-occurrences based on our belief system? Lieh-tzu’s answer: It’s all in how you think.