Author: Philip J Palin

Supply Chain Fitness

Supply Chain Resilience is especially attentive to wide-area, cross-sector, high volume, high velocity flows. Is there enough flow in the right channels to deliver what is needed when and where it is needed? This is analogous to the human body’s blood pressure being sufficient to feed oxygen and nutrients to our vital organs, but not get so fast and tight as to over-stress the cardiovascular system.

During the worst days of the pandemic, global supply chains were arguably experiencing dangerously high pressure. It was possible to perceive supply chain equivalents of multiple blood-clots emerging simultaneously. The Global Supply Chain Pressure Index tracked that high pressure for most of 2020 through 2022. But we have spent most of 2023 with pressure well-below historical averages. (See first chart below.)

Are we now in danger of hypotension — too-low supply chain pressure? There are some US producers, shippers, carriers, retailers and consumers that have experienced related symptoms. But no, as a whole, current US flow is strong, consistent, even athletic. In many cases pandemic stress has resulted in higher capacity, increased efficiency, and more effective flows.

Below are some current measures that — in combination with the GSCPI, Logistics Manager’s Index, and other more comprehensive efforts — may suggest where our fitness routine is most successful or needs some extra attention.

Agricultural Production: There are places having serious food production problems, such as Argentina, Ukraine, and North Georgia (US) and Wisconsin. But total world production is mostly higher. According to the November World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE), “The global wheat outlook for 2023/24 is for increased supplies, fractionally lower consumption, less trade, and larger ending stocks… Global coarse grain production for 2023/24 is forecast up 4.8 million tons to 1,499.3 million… The 2023/24 global rice outlook this month is for higher supplies, consumption, trade, and nearly unchanged stocks… The global 2023/24 soybean supply and demand forecast includes lower beginning stocks, higher production, higher crush, and lower ending stocks. Beginning stocks are reduced 1.6 million tons, reflecting offsetting back-year balance sheet revisions for China and Brazil. China’s beginning stocks are reduced on lower soybean imports for 2021/22 and 2022/23 and higher crush for 2022/23. Conversely, Brazil’s beginning stocks are increased on a larger 2022/23 crop of 158 million tons due to higher-than-expected use to date.” Where there is increased supply, prices are — not surprisingly — falling (here and here and here).

Global Natural Gas Demand and Supply: This week Bloomberg reported, “European natural gas traders have started taking fuel out of the region’s record inventories as colder weather settles in, drawing from its buffer against winter supply shocks. Consecutive net withdrawals took place for the first time since April this week, data from Gas Infrastructure Europe show, and may accelerate as parts of Europe face below-normal temperatures over the weekend. For now the withdrawals are marginal, and storage facilities remain over 99% full.” Asia’s demand for natural gas reflects continued economic sluggishness across the region. According to Reuters, Asian “prices have so far failed to get their usual seasonal bump as demand remains relatively subdued and supply is more than adequate, especially from the United States.” US natural gas inventories and production continue to be strong. According to the EIA as of November 15, current domestic stockpiles are at the second-highest end-of-refill-season level experienced during the past five years. US spot prices are two-thirds below fourth-quarter 2022 benchmarks, even though US consumption is slightly above last year. This affordable abundance is not limited to natural gas. Diesel flows have adapted better than many (including me) were worried about last year. The collapse of fossil fuel prices over the last few weeks is unlikely to reverse without severe reductions in supply (not impossible, but…). [November 20 Update: Very helpful round-up of the current Atlantic LNG market from S&P Global.]

China Export Volumes and Value: During October Chinese exports fell 6.4% compared to October 2022 according to China’s General Administration of Customs. This was the sixth month of consecutive declines and reflects a steeper decline than September’s 6.2% reduction (more). It is, however, helpful to differentiate between volumes and value. For example Barron’s reports, “Beijing is selling as much as ever, if not more, volume-wise. It’s the price of exports that’s dropping—8% year over year at the last reading, says Duncan Wrigley, chief China economist at Pantheon Macroeconomics. “China has become a global disinflationary force,” confirms Larry Hu, chief China economist at Macquarie Group. The yuan is partly responsible: It is down 3% against the dollar over the past 12 months.” Given China’s proportion of global flows its current condition is relevant to the health of the whole. A body with a great pulse rate but circulation problems or arthritis in the feet is not likely to do well running a marathon. [November 19 Update: Related commentary by Ruchir Sharma in the Financial Times.]

North American Grid Capacity: Extreme weather is prompting demand spikes that challenge North American (and other) electrical grids. This challenge is compounded where — as in Texas — episodic demand piles-on sustained growth in systemic demand caused by increased population and economic activity (more and more). As recently outlined here, the US grid will face serious threats if — likely when — severe winter weather prompts simultaneous increased demand and disrupted supply. [November 20 Update: The New York Times compares US sources electricity generation with that of other nations.]

US Personal Consumption Expenditures: The US Census Bureau’s method for measuring retail sales is differentiated from how the US Bureau of Economic Analysis calculates Personal Consumption Expenditures. But a flattening of the growth rate for US retail sales during October will almost certainly be echoed in the October consumption data to be released in a couple of weeks. Slowed growth at the current high levels of demand (see second chart below) is not, however, a systemic threat. The US economy is very active, as such domestic consumer demand has been robust. Food, fuel and most other supplies are flowing as needed without much stress. There are aging edges. There are comparatively weaker bones and muscles. Some extra attention, coaching, even therapy is needed. But right now the overall flow between demand and supply is about as healthy as a body this mature and this big can usually get.

GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN PRESSURE INDEX (Federal Reserve Bank of New York)

US retail sales slow (?)

According to the US Census Bureau, after strong September retail sales, “Advance estimates of U.S. retail and food services sales for October 2023, adjusted for seasonal variation and holiday and trading-day differences, but not for price changes, were $705.0 billion, down 0.1 percent (±0.5 percent)* from the previous month, and up 2.5 percent (±0.7 percent) above October 2022. Total sales for the August 2023 through October 2023 period were up 3.1 percent (±0.4 percent) from the same period a year ago. The August 2023 to September 2023 percent change was revised from up 0.7 percent (±0.5 percent) to up 0.9 percent (±0.2 percent).”

Bloomberg explains, “Seven out of 13 categories posted declines, led by furniture and car dealers. Gasoline sales weren’t as big of a drag on the headline number as feared considering how much pump prices fell in the month. Meanwhile, outlays increased at personal-care and grocery stores… so-called core goods prices, which exclude food and energy commodities, fell for a fifth month in October. So the decline in retail sales — which aren’t adjusted for inflation — may reflect lower prices rather than fewer transactions.” (More and more and more)

Food-At-Home sales (see first chart below) increased to $73,962 million from $72,726 million in September. Grocery sales are up about 0.9 percent compared to October 2022. Food-Away-From-Home increased from $91,791 million in September to $92,079 million in October. Eating out is up 8.6 percent in compared to October 2022.

Non-store retailers — aka ecommerce — are seeing almost as much Year-Over-Year growth as the restaurant category at 7.6 percent, continuing the power-curve launched early in the pandemic (see second chart below). These non-store retail results motivate consumer-facing supply chains to focus on fulfillment velocity. (Here, the WSJ video emphasizes speed, but please note it is a matter of speedy delivery to particular persons/places.) November 16 Update: There are more than 4600 Walmart stores in the United States, it is not a non-store retailer and, still, for the third quarter just reported online sales increased 24 percent while overall revenue grew 5.2 percent.

Demand is strong while much less volatile than 2020 to mid-2022. In most categories supply is now sufficient to fulfill demand. Prices are moving in a manner coherent with demand patterns, competition, and several months of tighter monetary policy. These are flows well-within the capacity of current US networks.

Cyberattack on Australia’s ports

On Friday, November 10, DP World Australia container port operations in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane, and Fremantle were seriously disrupted by a cyberattack (more and more). DP World handles roughly 40 percent of Australia’s maritime throughput (in and out). This morning the BBC reported: “DP World Australia, a unit of the Dubai state-owned DP World, said its ports resumed operations at 09:00 local time “following successful tests of key systems overnight… The company expects that approximately 5,000 containers will move out of the four Australian terminals today.” Bloomberg is reporting that the three day slowdown prompted a back up of roughly 30,000 containers. Recovery of normal flows will require several days. But unless there are malware aftershocks or new attacks are experienced, Christmas retail should not be seriously impacted (a concern raised over the weekend in Australian media (here and here).

Restrained inland waterways

Sunday night the PBS NewsHour ran a helpful overview of how upstream drought has squeezed midstream flows to seriously reduce downstream discharge on the Mississippi River (more). The story offers an especially helpful comparison of capacity differences between barge, rail, and trucking alternatives (full story is eight minutes). Per the river gauge at Memphis, a slight recovery of still-very-low water levels during October’s second half of has now reversed (see chart below). The World Economic Forum recently updated its report of reduced flows on the Amazon, Rhine, Mississippi, and Yangtze. This blog has continued to watch as throughput at the Panama Canal is cut (more and more).

More winter worries

Yesterday the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) released its 2023-2024 Winter Reliability Assessment for the North American grid. Here’s how NERC summarizes its findings:

…much of North America is again at an elevated risk of having insufficient energy supplies to meet demand in extreme operating conditions. The areas identified as being at elevated risk extend over much of the eastern two-thirds of the continent. In these areas, although resources are adequate for normal winter peak demand, any prolonged, wide-area cold snaps will be challenging due to generator outages and fuel vulnerability, extreme levels of electricity demand, difficulties in accurate forecasting and the risk of firm electricity transfer curtailments.

Below is a map with risk assessments for each of the regional bulk power networks.

Bloomberg explains, “The grid’s vulnerabilities have been revealed during storms in recent years, notably a 2021 deep freeze in Texas that left more than 200 people dead. While utilities and power generators have made efforts to weather-proof equipment, the NERC report determined that many are still at risk. Gas and coal deliveries can both be hampered during extreme weather and plants can be forced offline, just as cold temperatures drive up power consumption.”

There was also a very close call late last year impacting MISO, PJM, and SERC (both C and E). Here and here are some related reports by this blog. As usual I tend to emphasize demand dynamics. Here is the FERC plus NERC report on that event. Please read this report. It is clear, comprehensive, detailed, and helpfully frames the strategic (architectural?) and tactical (engineering?) challenges for moving forward. Here is a brief example:

From December 21 to 26, 2022, in the Event Area, a total of 1,702 individual generating units—47 percent natural gas-fired, 21 percent wind, 12 percent coal, 3 percent solar, 0.4percent nuclear, 17 percent other (oil, hydroelectric and biomass)—experienced 3,565 outages, derates, or failures to start… Ninety-six percent of all outages, derates, and failures to start were attributed to three causes: Freezing Issues (31 percent), Fuel Issues (24 percent) and Mechanical/Electrical Issues (41 percent). Of those outages, derates, and failures to start, 55 percent were caused by either Freezing Issues or Fuel Issues… Natural Gas Fuel Issues (a subset, but the majority, of Fuel Issues) were 20 percent of all causes, and issues with other fuels were four percent. In addition to the outages, derates, and failures to start caused by Freezing Issues, those caused by Mechanical/Electrical Issues also indicated a clear pattern related to cold temperatures—as temperatures decreased, the number of generating units experiencing an outage, derate or failure to start due to Mechanical/Electrical Issues increased.

Good news: The current long range winter forecast for North America calls for above-average temperatures and extended extreme cold seems to have become less common than extreme heat (not exactly good news in August). Bad news: our temperature averages increasingly include more extreme short-term events — such as Winter storms Uri and Elliott. In the Northern Hemisphere these sudden onset anomalies are often associated with the polar vortex. Halloween weekend much of the United States experienced a rapid cool-down courtesy of polar weather escaping to the south. As winter deepens, these quick holiday flights — Christmas, New Years, Ground Hogs Day — will get even colder.

Low pressure (not no pressure)

One prominent measure of global supply chain flow finds the least friction in a quarter-century. Please see the chart below. Average viscosity is represented by zero. In October the measure was 1.74 standard deviations below average.

According to the authors of the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York:

The GSCPI integrates a number of commonly used metrics with the aim of providing a comprehensive summary of potential supply chain disruptions. Global transportation costs are measured by employing data from the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) and the Harpex index, as well as airfreight cost indices from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The GSCPI also uses several supply chain-related components from Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) surveys, focusing on manufacturing firms across seven interconnected economies: China, the euro area, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Bloomberg explains, “The gauge has clocked nine straight months of negative readings. The cost of moving goods by rail, truck, sea and air has declined from record highs set during the pandemic.”

Good news for many is not good news for all. Maersk has announced significant layoffs. Looking at the October US freight market, Zach Strickland at FreightWaves observed: “After a year of loose conditions, transportation providers are running through cash reserves built up from the freight boom and starting to fall out of the market. Operating authorities for interstate carriers of property have fallen 6% since last July according to Carrier Details’ analysis of the FMCSA data.  The capacity ceiling is falling and will eventually run into demand and lead to increasing service disruptions.” (More and more.)

From August 2020 to August 2022 the US freight market substantially increased capacity to fulfill demand shifts and increased demand overall. Since August 2022 demand has softened. For two years content was chasing very tight spaces. Now space is chasing content. Demand is still decent or better. Shipments have not fallen off the cliff. But we no longer need all the freight capacity that was needed one year ago.

Global Supply Chain Pressure Index (GSCPI)

Threat resilience or vulnerability resilience

Last week I was asked to recommend a well-established private sector, business continuity process that focuses on all-hazards instead of specific threats. I was surprised — chagrined — that nothing immediately came to mind. If you have suggestions, please let me know…

In response I did send along two recent studies:

PwC has published a 2023 Global Crisis and Resilience Survey that found, “It is no longer sufficient for organisations to be in silos as they address today’s complex and interconnected risks. Enterprises are actively moving to an integrated approach to resilience, centrally governing and aligning multiple resilience capabilities around what matters most to the business, and embedding the programme into operations and the corporate culture.” Only one in five respondents self-assess they have a sufficiently integrated approach.

Accenture has recently published a similar analysis entitled Resiliency in the Making. Here’s one of several findings:

The turbulence of the last few years has forced many businesses to address the vulnerabilities in their highly globalized supply and production networks. Our research shows companies are reducing their dependency on sole sourcing strategic commodities in the next three years. Regional sourcing is also bouncing back. Numbers are set to leap from 38% of respondents today mostly sourcing regionally to 65% in the next three years. Leaders are also prioritizing proximity-based hubs that concentrate production facilities and sales within the same region to streamline logistics, improve inventory management and accelerate response to market demand. We found that the manufacturing of products across multiple plants is expected to rise from 41% today to 78% in three years’ time. 

McKinsey research has produced similar findings and related recommendations. Boston Consulting Group has a business resilience practice.

Many more consultancies seek to minimize commercial losses and seize comparative advantage through resilience practices. The consultancies are interested in generating new business. Consultants generate new business by persuasively articulating problems and offering plausible solutions to the problems articulated.

Increased attention to resilience reflects the after-effects of pandemic problems, climate change, increasing geopolitical risks, social-civil conflict, political gridlock, and related economic volatility. Surveys of current and potential clients also suggest unfulfilled demand. Please notice the anticipatory nature of the quotes above. The PwC survey found that only about one-fifth of respondents have “implemented initiatives to protect their workforce or physical assets from the impacts of climate risk.” Even implemented is not completed. Lots of need, lots of consulting opportunities.

The business enterprise that asked about an all-hazards approach currently takes a threat-specific approach. In other words: here’s what we should do in case of this kind of impact to this kind of asset. Were our lives ever that simple? With some rare exceptions, yes — for many firms operating in many places this sort of limited, rather linear risk management (perhaps emergency management) was mostly sufficient.

What has changed over the last thirty-plus years is that scale — both population and wealth — has exploded. As both effect and cause of this increased scale, speed (really velocity, both speed and direction) has dramatically accelerated (more). Given the capital costs required to serve this scale with speed there has been much more intense concentration of productive assets, both in terms of physical places and corporate ownership. As as result, for our most capable firms, risk profiles are much more complicated and extended — increasing the likelihood of experiencing hard hits someplace, sometime. Then, given increasingly tight concentration of capacity, a hard hit in any one place is much more likely to escalate, accelerate, and cascade consequences across the entire networked system.

The same systems that speed fulfillment of high-volume demand will also speed the effects of high-impact hits. Depending on context, our greatest strength can become our greatest weakness.

How do we imagine and prepare for our greatest strength failing?

Vulnerability assessment is hardly new, see Sun-Tzu, Thucydides, Sophocles, and Genesis among many more. The distinction between threat-based and capability-based planning has become common in the post-Cold War era. The now venerable SWOT method even offers the chance to consider potential relationships between strengths and weaknesses before taking up threats. But it is my experience that threats are more inherently motivating of change than any other factor. Fear of losing even trumps the opportunity to win. Some psychological studies find that most humans feel the pain of loss twice as intensively as the equivalent pleasure of gain (here and here). We can blame several thousand years of evolution under quite urgent threat conditions — and our reluctance to really, seriously, self-critically think — especially about variably emerging futures.

Given the scope and scale of our most capable enterprises and the complexity of our most serious threats, a vulnerability focus absolutely makes sense. Many threats are beyond prediction or even much influence, but our vulnerabilities are almost always self-created. We can engage and reshape vulnerabilities to reduce hazards — if we can gin-up the honest self-awareness, courage, key relationships, and practical sustained commitment this requires.

Focusing on all-hazards does not ignore threats. Considering weaknesses or vulnerabilities begs the question: vulnerable to what? Effective risk reduction involves both threats and vulnerabilities. But leading with our vulnerabilities while giving primacy to alleviating vulnerabilities (to typically uncertain threats) requires an uncommon sort of institutional culture.

I appreciate the request. I regret the insufficient response. Look for more on this topic over the next few weeks.

Realistic expectations for China flows

Recently there have been signs of economic recovery in China. For example, here and here and here. It is a huge economy that has demonstrated considerable resilience despite several very hard knocks (some self-administered). It would be a mistake to under-value current conditions or future potential. But I don’t yet see evidence for much sustained, significant improvement in domestic demand, European demand, or US demand (for China’s output). Ergo, why should we expect major growth in outbound flows? I also see plenty of cause for continued — even systemic — sluggishness. This morning I heard Leland Miller give a great summary of a reality that fits what I seem to perceive — and unlike me he has the chops to offer more than wild guesses. The interview begins at about the 40:15 mark. [Please see update below video.]

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October 31 Update: The Financial Times reports, “China’s manufacturing activity unexpectedly contracted in October, damping hopes of increasing momentum in the world’s second-largest economy. The country’s official manufacturing purchasing managers’ index came in at 49.5 this month, missing forecasts and trailing a reading of 50.2 in September. A reading below 50 marks contraction against the previous month.” Reuters offers this explanation: “The weak PMI data may reflect some of the weakness in demand related to the housing slump and a slowdown in infrastructure spending,” said Xu Tianchen, senior economist at the Economist Intelligence Unit. “Although there are signs of exports bottoming out, a strong recovery in external demand is probably elusive,” he added. Both new export and imports orders shrank for an eight consecutive month, suggesting that manufacturers were struggling for buyers overseas and ordering fewer components used in finished goods for re-export.”

November 7 Update: The Wall Street Journal reports, “Chinese exports fell 6.4% in October compared with a year earlier, to $275 billion, China’s General Administration of Customs said Tuesday (November 6), a steeper decline than the 6.2% fall recorded in September… Diminishing exports show global demand for Chinese goods is subdued as consumers and businesses contend with slowing growth and higher borrowing costs. Other Asian export powerhouses, such as South Korea and Taiwan, have also reported months of feeble overseas sales.”

Winter Preparations

In an October update Emily Becker with the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) forecasts, “El Niño will continue through the spring, with a 75-85% chance it will become a strong event. A stronger El Niño… means it is more likely that we will see El Niño’s expected thumbprint on winter temperature and rain/snow patterns around the world.”

In yesterday’s Sunday New York Times, three economists argued:

El Niño’s warming builds on top of the already warmer average temperatures that come with climate change. This makes El Niño’s ancillary impacts — higher food prices, more infectious diseases, and even civil war — increasingly more likely, and dangerous. It also provides a warning sign of what is to come as climate change worsens. Our research suggests that this year’s El Niño could lead to events like crop failures that push up to 6.8 million children into severe hunger. (Their original research is here.)

Depending on location El Niño and La Niña periods can have opposite effects (see map below). More rain for the US Southwest and Texas is not necessarily bad news, but major flooding would not be welcome. It is hard to find a silver lining for high heat and low precipitation across South Asia or the Amazon basin or Southern Africa.

Where I sit today, it is a bright day in early autumn. As recently outlined here and elsewhere, the US economy is bustling about and surprisingly strong. Many leading indicators are fine or better than fine. I live in that dark green (cool and wet) spot over the Southeast United States. It has been too dry. We need the precipitation.

Probabilities are not certainties. But we ignore plausible patterns at our peril. When I combine climatological probabilities with troublesome economic probabilities (here and here and here) and geopolitical patterns (here and here and here) — well, an icy winter seems all too likely despite warm sunshine here and now.

Even for those reasonably well-prepared, a collision of hard hits can cascade tough consequences across demand and supply networks. Hidden vulnerabilities are unveiled. Systemic risks are amplified. Given the interdependencies of contemporary supply chains, the ill-prepared are unlikely to be the only ones left dancing (see farther below).

Pulling push persists

To the extent that demand pulls, sizes, and organizes supply — and in most advanced economies, this is mostly the case — then consumption can be said to fuel supply. According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis:

Personal income increased $77.8 billion (0.3 percent at a monthly rate) in September. Disposable personal income (DPI)—personal income less personal current taxes— increased $56.1 billion (0.3 percent). Personal outlays—the sum of personal consumption expenditures (PCE), personal interest payments, and personal current transfer payments—increased $175.1 billion (0.9 percent) and consumer spending increased $138.7 billion (0.7 percent). Personal saving was $687.7 billion and the personal saving rate—personal saving as a percentage of disposable personal income—was 3.4 percent in September.

The first chart below displays a five year trend for overall nominal PCE and Real PCE. The second chart is focused on nominal and real expenditures on food-at-home. It is meaningful to me that in September 2023 US consumers spent 1154.9 billion inflation-adjusted dollars on food compared to 1160.1 billion inflation-adjusted dollars in September 2022. This suggests more careful shopping by millions.

Still, on the whole Americans continue to spend more. In September expenditures on cars, pharmaceuticals, and travel showed particular strength (more). Personal outlays grew at a rate more than double personal income. Bloomberg quotes two economists who say, “Consumers continued to live beyond their means in September, with personal spending growth far outstripping income gains … We think that dynamic cannot persist much longer.” I wonder about the implications of potentially very different expenditure patterns by the top two income quintiles compared to the bottom three quintiles.

In any case, this year the overall US economy has continued to show rather amazing strength (see third chart below and more). Wages are increasing. Over 9.6 million jobs are currently “open“. Given recent demand — and the prospects of similar demand — I expect the current level of supply activity to persist at least through the end of the year.