Category: Uncategorized

Ukraine spring planting update

Before the war Ukraine was one of the world’s top five grain exporters. According to Deutsche Weld, in 2021 Ukraine accounted for 10 percent of the world wheat market, 13 percent of the barley market, 15 percent of the corn market, and more than half of global trade in sunflower oil.

Since the February 2022 invasion, grain exports from Ukraine have been at least one-third less than 2021. It might have been much worse except for a deal brokered by the United Nations and Turkey to facilitate Black Sea flows.

According to the EU, as of March 2023, “over 23 million tonnes of grain and other foodstuffs have been exported via the Black Sea Grain Initiative. Almost 49% of the cargo was maize, the grain most affected by blockages in Ukrainian granaries at the beginning of the war (75% of the 20 million tonnes of grain stored). It had to be moved quickly to make space for wheat from the summer harvest.”

The 2022 summer harvest was disrupted by the war. According to government sources, as of January 2023, “Ukrainian farms have harvested 49.5 million tonnes of grain from 10.7 million hectares of crops, with the grain yield averaging 4.64 tonnes per hectare.” Final results from the harvest are expected at 51 million tonnes of grain for 2022, down from a record 86 million tonnes in 2021, because of land occupied by Russian forces and lower yields (more).

Of course the war continues — Spring offensives and counter-offensives are pending. Further reductions in planting and harvesting are anticipated (more and more). In April Russia limited extension of the Black Sea flow to thirty days (more and more). Many do not expect the initiative to survive mid-May. Exports by river and rail heading toward Western European markets and ports have also been logistically and politically complicated (more and more and more). Some credible sources suggest that this year Ukraine’s harvest will fall another 37 percent year-over-year to 34 million tonnes. Export channels will continue to be troubled, especially if Black Sea routes are lost.

It is very early in the Northern Hemisphere’s planting season. Harvests cannot yet be confidently predicted. Still, the USDA offers, “The global wheat outlook for 2022/23 is for increased supplies, higher consumption, and reduced trade and stocks. Supplies are raised 0.7 million tons to 1,061.1 million, primarily on higher beginning stocks for Syria and increased production for Ethiopia.” Hence the price action displayed below. USDA is not as optimistic regarding corn and rice.

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April 28 Update: Javier Blas considers the mismatch of supply and demand for Ukraine’s grain, “Ukrainian grain is badly needed in Europe – just not where is accumulating [e.g., Poland, Romania and Hungary]. Instead, it’s sought after in Spain and Italy, already suffering from a drought, and in the Netherlands, home of a very large livestock industry. But moving it there is difficult.” Blas very helpfully outlines logistical and supply chain difficulties that policy-makers have not — yet — engaged.

Current conditions in Spain and June forecasts for Spain, France, and other parts of Western Europe suggest another hot, dry summer.

Unusually cold weather in Northern China is likely to seriously reduce this year’s harvest of apples and other fruit.

Sudden snowmelt in California threatens planting and harvesting of a variety of crops.

April 29 Update: Nice summary from Bloomberg Green: “Dry conditions are occurring across much of Spain, through southern France and into northern Italy. The eastern and southern Black Sea areas are also stressed, according to the European Drought Observatory. In addition to southern Europe, large parts of Norway, Sweden and Finland are lacking soil moisture. New figures show the US is facing similar trouble. The latest from the US Drought Monitor shows 25.55% of the contiguous US (the 48 states) is in drought. Most of that is in central and lower Great Plains: 81.92% of Kansas and more than half of Texas is in drought.”

Natural Gas: Been to the mountain and back?

Below is a two year view of a benchmark futures contract for natural gas in Europe. This nicely scopes and scales nervous demand for replacing Russian flows with alternate flows for the winter now behind us.

It went much better than I was expecting last May-June.

In August 2022 more than 300 Euros were required to purchase what was available yesterday for a shade over 40 Euros. That’s an eighty-seven percent drop.

The second chart below is the spot price for natural gas at the Henry Hub (on the US Gulf Coast). The same-volume could be promptly purchased for less in New York or Chicago (Henry Hub pricing is much more export oriented). Seems to me this is the same mountain range as Dutch TTF was traveling, just a slightly different path. Since August we have descended from a high of almost 10 dollars to last Wednesday’s spot price of $2.20. That’s a seventy-eight percent drop.

Last summer might a buyer in Rotterdam be nine percent more nervous than a buyer in Lake Charles? Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp (ARA) traders have a well-deserved reputation for self-composed discipline. For example, yesterday you could a buy a Dutch TTF February 2024 contract for 55.5 Euros/MW.

I expect European natural gas stockpiles to be re-filled in time for next winter. But I am not willing to bet on next winter being quite so mild… and I expect the war in Ukraine to get very hot (here and here and here). There are plenty of other externalities that I am not as inclined to discount as deeply as my Dutch cousins and Flemish friends.

More (concentrated) capacity

The expansion of ExxonMobil’s Beaumont Refinery is significant (more and more). After three years of declining US refining capacity, adding a quarter-million barrels per day is helpful.

US domestic demand for refined products is experiencing long-term decline. But ready production capacity needs to be larger than realistic demand capacity — and this ratio has been closing fast, probably too fast. Beaumont’s expansion — and new refineries outside the United States — offer much needed adaptive capacity, constructive for resilient volumes and pricing.

Since the turn of the century, US refining capacity has increased from about 16.3 million barrels per day to just a bit more than 18 million barrels per day (even as real GDP has increased from about $1300 billion to more than $2000 billion). This increased capacity has been achieved despite thirty-three US refineries closing since 2000. There are now 128-to-131 US refineries poised to operate, depending on maintenance schedules.

The top-ten percent of the US refinery fleet by capacity can produce close to one-third of total flows. The top twenty percent can generate more than half of total flows. Seven of the largest capacity refineries (plus others) are shown on the first map below. These seven refineries alone represent one-fifth of total US refining capacity… all well-within the well-worn paths of hurricane alley.

On the Pacific capacity concentrations reflect even higher proportions of each region’s flows. Please see the second map below. Four refineries north of Seattle produce most of the fuel on which Western Washington and Oregon depend. The refineries along the edges of San Francisco Bay are as crucial for northern and central California. Refineries in the Los Angeles basin serve Las Vegas, San Diego, and Phoenix too. All these refineries and their related pipelines are susceptible to potentially serious seismic consequences.

The Threats (T) are very real, so are the concentrated Vulnerabilities (V). Given these capacity clusters and population dependence, the Consequences (C) will be terrible when a high-impact threat scores a direct hit on any of these core vulnerabilities (that are usually strengths).

LEGEND: barrels are refineries, dark brown are crude pipelines, light-brown are refined pipelines, blue flames are natural gas processing facilities.

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April 28 Update: Valero’s quarterly results provide a helpful window into tight capacity serving robust demand.

Revised Vital Signs

Since November we have monitored five indicators of Supply Chain Resilience. These have been intended to supplement more comprehensive measures such as the Global Supply Chain Pressure Index (GSCPI) and the CSCMP Logistics Manager’s Index. These and similar indices remain important. (Here are the vital sign updates for December, January, February, and March.)

It is now time for some seasonal updates.

Since Thanksgiving I have focused on southern hemisphere agricultural production; starting now I will shift to northern hemisphere agricultural production. Instead of diesel demand and production, I will shift to flows and prices of natural gas. I will continue to focus on China’s export volumes and prices. I will continue to look at what is happening with North American capacity to produce and transport electricity. I will replace covid consumption of hospitalization with US Personal Consumption Expenditures (despite the increasing risk of pandemics).

As usual, I will try to discern the dynamics of pull and push, especially of any friction emerging between pull and push. There is a bias toward fulfilling US demand. There is particular concern for food and energy flows.

North American Agricultural Production: US winter wheat has been seriously stressed by drought. Planting corn is being delayed by snow and wet weather. Soybean planting is just barely getting underway in the core US soybean producing regions. (More and more) Winter still reigns over most of Canada. USDA projects that US acres-under-cultivation will increase in 2023 (more). We will see what El Nino may mean for the growing season and yields.

Global Natural Gas Demand and Supply: The northern hemisphere’s “heating season” concluded on March 31. This season featured low demand due to a comparatively mild winter. According to the Energy Information Administration, “Net withdrawals of natural gas from underground storage facilities totaled 1,707 billion cubic feet (Bcf) during the 2022–23 heating season (November–March)—the lowest on record since the 2015–16 heating season. Working natural gas in underground storage facilities in the Lower 48 states totaled 1,830 Bcf as of March 31, 2023, according to the Weekly Natural Gas Storage Report (WNGSR), exceeding the five-year average (2018–22) by 294 Bcf (19%), after entering the heating season at a 110 Bcf (3%) deficit to the five-year average.” (More) Due to both mild weather and aggressive purchases, EU natural gas inventory levels are now more than double (56 percent) of end of March 2022 stocks-available (26 percent) (more). Natural gas prices have trended sharply lower since mid-2022 (here and here).

China Export Volumes and Value: Earlier this week Reuters reported, “China’s exports unexpectedly surged in March, with officials flagging rising demand for electric vehicles, but analysts cautioned the improvement partly reflects suppliers catching up with unfulfilled orders after last year’s COVID-19 disruptions.” (More) For the six months before March exports have consistently fallen from very high levels through most of 2022. Bloomberg highlights that this increased (temporary?) push reflects much more pull from East Asia than from the US or EU. Please see chart below.

North American Grid Capacity: Increasing demand for electricity is prompting construction of additional generating capacity. According to the Energy Information Administration, renewables will provide the highest proportion of new capacity. Current capacity (see second chart below) remains mostly dependent on fossil fuels. Capacity to generate does not necessarily translate into capacity to deliver. According to UtilityDive, “Since the last wave of major U.S. transmission development about 10 years ago, the transmission system is running out of spare capacity… The growing queues of generators seeking to connect to the grid are a symptom of the maxed out transmission system… Major power system failures and instances of congestion are likely to increase without transmission expansion.” (More and more)

US Personal Consumption Expenditures: US consumers have continued to spend. Friday’s retail sales report found a slight decline in spending between February and March, but year-over-year figures remain robust. For example, retail sales of Food-At-Home were eight percent higher than February (not inflation-adjusted). First quarter sales at food and drinking places (Food-Away-From-Home) were 17.3 percent above first quarter 2022. There is still cause to anticipate some softening of March Personal Consumption Expenditures (please see third chart below). SNAP benefits have been cut and wage growth has slowed, plus some speculate the mid-March banking crisis might have suppressed expenditures. It will be another two weeks before we see the March PCE.

Healthy pull is, so far, prompting improved push. There is not much excess capacity. But pull is mostly being fulfilled. The problems emerge where there is real need, but insufficient pull (more and more and more). There is also reason to wonder if supply capacity can keep up with the increasing rate of demand capacity growth.

Real consumption of food

February expenditures on Food-At-Home — adjusted for inflation — have once again increased. An updated January real PCE for food has also been adjusted upward (see chart below).

In February 2019 real Personal Consumption Expenditure (PCE) for food was $964.1 billion. In February 2020, just as the pandemic began to emerge, inflation adjusted expenditure on food was $986 billion. Then demand went crazy.

By February 2022 real PCE for food had fallen from unsustainable heights to $1055 billion. This February US consumers spent about $1031 billion on Food-At-Home. You can do the math. US consumers have apparently lifted their floor for grocery purchases… despite significant food inflation and plenty of competition for their spending. It will be interesting to see how the cut in SNAP benefits may shape the slope of the March PCE for food (released in late April).

During February spending for Food-Away-From-Home may have slightly declined (here and here). But strong employment (and demand for employees) and wage growth continue to support above “normal” (whatever that may mean anymore) grocery purchases. Food production, processing, and transportation have increased capacity to support this demand. The personal saving rate has moved up since a mid-2022 trough. Looks like food flows are likely to remain close to these elevated levels as long as employment and wages will allow.

Updating March Vitals

Long time no see. I apologize, but the next two weeks won’t be much better (I’m very sorry to say). Still, here’s a quick try at updating some flow indicators to which I have given regular attention for the last six months or so.

Southern Hemisphere Agricultural ProductionBrazil’s soybean harvest is close to complete and could exceed any previous year (more). Meanwhile Argentina’s drought has decimated output. “We are facing an unprecedented climatic event,” Julio Calzada, head of economic research the Rosario exchange, told Reuters, adding farmers were facing losses of $14 billion and 50 million tonnes less of grain output across soy, corn and wheat.” (More) Australia’s wheat harvest has been very strong.

On March 18 there was an agreement to continue agricultural exports from Ukraine’s ports through the Black Sea. The United Nations explains, “The Black Sea Grain Initiative, signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022, has been extended. The Initiative allows for the facilitation of the safe navigation for the exports of grain and related foodstuffs and fertilizers, including ammonia, from designated Ukrainian seaports. During the first two terms, some 25 million metric tonnes of grain and foodstuffs have been moved to 45 countrieshelping to bring down global food prices and stabilizing the markets.” But this agreement is scheduled to sunset after 60 days rather than the 120 days of prior agreements. There is also increasing concern regarding constrained crop production for the upcoming harvest (here and here and here) regardless of available discharge routes. Still front-month Wheat futures are down more than one-third over the last year — much more than one-third from price spikes over the last twelve months.

Global Diesel Demand, Production, and Price: US diesel inventories continue to slowly increase, two-steps forward then one-step back. Export opportunities are increasing US diesel production — but not storage (related). Still, prices are down an average of almost 95 cents per gallon over the last year. The benchmark European future price for diesel has fallen more than 15 percent since mid-January and is down more than the one-fifth from highs last summer. Labor actions at French refineries have recently constrained EU diesel production and supported prices, but overall European inventories remain elevated as result of January-February stockpiling and reduced demand. Slower economic activity and lower natural gas prices have reduced EU diesel consumption (related). Reuters describes current diesel inventories in Asia as a “supply glut.”

Covid Hospitalizations (and mutations): Hospitalizations are down from early January peaks in North America, Western Europe, and much of East Asia. Worst case expectations regarding the China reopening did not happen.

China’s Export Volumes and Value: Previously reported 2022 declines in China’s exports continued in January and February (more and more). Bloomberg explains, “Global demand for Chinese goods started falling in late 2022 as soaring inflation in the rest of the world and higher interest rates took a toll on consumer spending.” While the declines are significant (even equal to 20 percent, depending on the metric) current flows are roughly equivalent to pre-pandemic patterns. China’s domestic consumer spending is gradually recovering (more).

North American Electricity Supply and Demand:  As previously noted, there have been serious problems over the winter. Last week the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission took a sustained look at capacity constraints. According to Utility Dive, “Two commissioners of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission said… they see major reliability challenges across parts of the United States. “The capacity markets are not all right,” Commissioner Mark Christie said during the agency’s monthly meeting. “There are fundamental problems specifically in the multi-state capacity markets – ISO New England, [the Midcontinent Independent System Operator] and [the] PJM [Interconnection] – that are directly leading to serious reliability problems.” (More)

My diagnosis: There are some troubling (non)outputs, but current supplies are mostly sufficient to fulfill current demand for flows being monitored above. Capacity is tight. Global supply matches global demand, but just barely. Increased prices reflect the tight capacity (plus other factors). In some places, these prices effectively exclude consumers on the physical or functional peripheries of demand/supply networks. There is real cause for concern that our capacity to make and move food, fuel, and electric power can be agile enough to meet future demand, especially if capacity or outputs are further constrained or cut by war, natural disasters, or other extreme events.

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March 27 Update: Nice summary from S&P Global of the set up for several agricultural markets in Asia. Bloomberg reports on mixed March results for China’s economy, which are reinforced by comments by the CEO of Maersk in an interview with the Financial Times. Vincent Clerc told the FT, “When we started the year, there was this hope that as China reopens after Covid we would see a really strong rebound… we’ve not seen it yet . . . The Chinese consumer is a bit more stunned by what’s happened and is not in a splurging mood right now.”

March 29 Update: The Financial Times reports on unintended consequences emerging from EU flow facilitation for Ukraine’s grain shipments. “Ukraine’s tariff-free access to the EU has caused a grain glut in neighbouring countries, tanking the regional agricultural sector and leading to complaints that Brussels is paying farmers too little compensation.” Grain farmers in Romania and Poland have especially suffered collateral damage.

Global wheat flows

Given wartime constraints on Ukraine’s ports, processing, and internal transportation; serious US, European, Argentine, and other drought; and price-pinching by a strong US dollar, a few months ago there were credible wide-spread concerns regarding sufficient upstream supplies of wheat reaching downstream demand. There have been deep deficiencies in some places. But overall global flows have remained strong and wheat prices have mostly returned to pre-war patterns. Below is a very helpful overview created by S&P Global.

US food consumption slows (again)

US Personal Consumption Expenditures for food, adjusted for inflation, once again showed modest reductions in January (see chart below). In January $1021.9 billion chained 2012 dollars were spent compared to December’s $1022.5 billion (red line). This compares to $1084 billion in January 2022 and $985.9 billion in January 2020. Slowly, slowly we turn. But we are still spending at least two percent more on Food At Home than pre-pandemic — for reasons I can guess about, but have decided data cannot conclusively demonstrate. The economic implications of this consumer behavior (spending more for less) are making many nervous (here and here). But the supply chain implications seem rather benign, at least to me. The full January report from the Bureau of Economic Analysis is available here. In the version of the chart shown below the blue line is nominal consumer spending while the red line shows spending adjusted for inflation.

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February 26 Update: Writing at Bloomberg, Laura Curtis observes, “Supply chains across the world are healing up almost as fast as they broke down. That doesn’t mean the pressure they’re exerting on inflation will disappear as quickly… It’s easy to underestimate how long it can take for inflationary trends to work through supply chains.” She then gives evidence for the why, where, and how fast our velocity.

Slowing maritime flows

According to Loadstar, “January import volumes at the ten largest US container ports fell 17.9% against the record throughput of January last year, with the biggest declines at west coast ports.” This morning Bloomberg adds, “Container trade in China has been slow to pick up following Chinese New Year in late January, suggesting the market will likely continue to struggle in coming months as blank sailings have failed to arrest the slide in spot rates.” Demand has fallen deep and fast. The International Shipping News summarizes the current situation as, “the global shipping industry is facing a complex situation, with a freefall in container rates, weak demand, and a shift in trade routes. While the shipping industry may witness a rebound in the future, the current outlook remains uncertain.”

Updating vital signs

It has been about one month since my last update, here we go again:

Southern Hemisphere Agricultural Production: Brazil is poised for a record-breaking soybean harvest, while Argentina’s harvest goes from bad to worse (more and more to even less). Australian yields and export volumes are strong. Ukraine’s outflows have marginally improved, but future flows are profoundly uncertain. US exports are slightly down. (Good global overview from USDA.)

Global Diesel Demand, Production, and Price: The February 5 EU import ban on diesel refined in Russia was widely expected to drain stocks and increase prices. Not yet. Europe bought even more Russian diesel as the ban approached and Chinese exports to Europe have also surged (refining Russian crude?). US diesel inventories have improved since January lows, partially because others have not needed as much as expected (more). European futures have edged mostly higher since February 5, but not really much (see chart below).

Covid Hospitalizations (and mutations): The Lunar New Year holiday has come and gone with plenty of excess deaths in China but no recognized acceleration in mutations or increased virulence.

China’s Export Volumes and Value: Last year was a record-year for China’s exports, but demand cooled considerably in late 2022. According to Trading Economics, “Exports from China slumped 9.9% from a year earlier to USD 306.08 billion in December 2022, broadly in line with market consensus of a 10% fall and following a revised 8.9% drop a month earlier. This was the steepest fall in exports since January-February 2020, amid cooling global demand due to stubbornly high inflation and rising borrowing costs.” Bloomberg economists and others expect reduced demand for China’s exports to persist in the months ahead. Related reporting from the Financial Times, “This month it cost $1,444 to ship a standard 40ft steel container from eastern China to the US west coast at short notice, according to shipping data specialist Xeneta, down from a peak of $9,682 in March last year. The widespread delays and queues, which hit ports at the height of the pandemic, have also dissipated.” (But longer-term shipping costs are still well-above pre-pandemic.)

North American Electricity Supply and Demand: Earlier today the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ordered improved operational analysis, training, and grid-wide collaboration to reduce the risk of extreme weather to the national electrical grid (more and more). The late December grid crisis caused by sudden weather changes and unexpected shifts in demand across much of the Eastern half of the United States is prompting several efforts at systemic improvement, such as here and here and here and here and here. When this factor was included in these five vital signs, I was not expecting the depth of trouble we have seen this winter. But these hard hits and even more close calls are accelerating mitigation measures.

Two weeks ago the International Monetary Fund released its economic forecast for 2023. Among much more detailed projections, the IMF also offered, “the global economic outlook hasn’t worsened” which many received as good-enough news (more and more). Four months ago when I started monitoring these particular vital signs, I could imagine plausible outcomes much worse than those outlined above. As we move into the Northern Hemisphere’s springtime (wartime?), slightly different vital signs may be more meaningful. But flows of food, fuel, viruses, freight, and electricity are likely to be worth watching in one form or another.

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February 17 Update: Helpful complementary round-up on global food flows (and a few other bits) from Bloomberg. European natural gas prices fall to an 18 month — pre-war — low. German supplies of natural gas are in good shape, but there is a concern that demand management efforts are not meeting their objectives… warmer weather has been a much bigger help.

February 20 Update: Bloomberg gives us a “Big Read” on the out-sized role of Russia and China regarding flows of fertilizer.